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      oethe  once  wisely  remarked,  in  conversation  with  J. P.
            Eckermann (1825), “[a] great deal may be done by severity,
more by love, but most by clear discernment and impartial justice.”
Grayling’s new contribution to the popularization of  philosophy, in
this respect with regard to ethics, has achieved much by way of
lowering to the rank and file, the wisdom of  philosophical reflections
in this moving, straightforward and lucidly argumentative book.
However, much space in the severity and passion of  the text leaves
ample room for improvement, better yet, enhancement, not so much
by approaching his subjects with love as by treating the topics with
impartiality.
It is said, at least in philosophy, that questions outlive their
answers. In this book, Grayling exactly deals with one of  the perennial
questions from antiquity: “what values should we live by in order to
live the genuinely good life?” (ix). The whole of  history is dotted
with people forwarding ideas in answer to this question, one to
contradict a view, the other to refine, and a third to introduce
something altogether different; but all appeared a few rungs wanting
for the coveted definitive answer (if  such does exist). Although
Grayling is a tough-minded English philosopher, he does have a knack
for making more intelligible the minute intricacies of  academic
philosophy, reflected in the list of  books he contributed amongst
fairly many volumes recently published that fall under “Popular
Philosophy” (books which far better populate the philosophy section
of  bookstores which know not where to place feng shui, yoga and
New Age). As such, this book, though a fruit of  intense academic
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research with a long history of  personal philosophical reflection, is
written with the general public in mind.
The basic contention of  Grayling is that in the (Western) history
of  thought, a number of  (competing) ideas have been forwarded to
answer what is the best way to live a good life. All of  these ideas he
categorized under two headings: the religious transcendental approach
and the secular humanistic approach. Though such categories do
have their antecedents, to lump all possible approaches to the question
under only two headings may accrue some methodological weaknesses,
if  not betray easily the author’s partiality to the issues involved. In
the case of  Grayling’s book, both appear to apply.
Digging into the archaeology of  ideas, Grayling locates his
historical treatment beginning in ancient Greece, where we find the
“classical conception of  the good life”, reflected among the early
Greek philosophers, notably the triumvirate Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle. Grayling notes that the seeds, which bore fruit in the
Humanism of  the 17th century and the Enlightenment of  the 18th
century, are strewn in the fertile grown of  ancient Greek way of  life.
Hence, he refers to the intellectual spirit that dominates this phase
as the first enlightenment and first humanism. In this phase,
dominated by relative peace and political security, the concern for
the good life is equated with the concern for eudaemonia, or ‘happiness’
more broadly conceived. However, in the period after Aristotle, and
before Christianity’s conquest of  the Western world, referred to as
the Hellenistic age, Grayling identifies three competing ‘schools’ of
thought. Their approaches reflect the political instability on which
the ancient Roman Empire found itself  and with it, a change of
perspective on what the good life is, now concerned with ataraxia or
‘peace of  mind’. These three competing schools (Cynicism,
Epicureanism, and Stoicism) are the philosophical ideals dominating
the Hellenistic period, soon to be abruptly eclipsed in the conquest
of  the Roman Empire by Christianity. According to Grayling,
Christianity imposed “a deliberate hegemony over thought” (34) with
an ethics accordingly rooted in ‘divine command’. And for him, any
reasoning that appeals to authority commits the logical fallacy of the
argumentum ad baculum.
Though Grayling started with two attitudes to the good life –
the religious and the secular – the methodological flaw emerges
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immediately in the number of  pages he devotes to treat these two
attitudes fairly. The whole book contains only nine chapters inclusive
of  the introduction. Of  all the remaining eight chapters, Grayling
devotes only one chapter on the religious transcendental attitude
(and it is not even the longest chapter!). The last chapter does contain
a few more treatment on this attitude, with the idea being summarized
in the chapter heading “Laying the Ghosts”. In the rest of  the
chapters, the transcendental attitude is pitted against his thorough
treatment of  the secular humanist. Grayling’s methodological
approach does not betray any hidden intention since even in the
book’s preface, he remarks that “the point I make is a partisan one” (x).
As a reviewer, honesty demands the explicit statement that
Grayling’s own (un-)fair treatment of  religion in general, and
Christianity in particular, reflects some truths that any discerning
believer or at least thoughtful sympathizer of  religion cannot fail but
see. Reading the book and comparing it with another one by Bertrand
Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (1927), Grayling appears more
nuanced and well informed; albeit his dogged conviction, surely a
fruit of  his own reflection on the matters at hand, seems to leave no
room for reconsideration. The departure of  religion lies in the fact
that it tries to ground the value of  nature and human activity outside
human subject and unto the divine command of  god (the whole
book deliberately has no god with a capital “G”). For Grayling,
affirming the intrinsic value of  things and persons necessarily negates
the god-postulate of  (theistic) religion and/or any form of
transcendental attitude that locates the value of  things and persons
external to them. Chapter Four, on “The Ordinances of  God”, is a
heavily forceful chapter where the searing tension between the
humanist and religious attitudes emerges, to which the reviewer invites
the reader for a quick peak through its thirty pages, not so much for
its conclusions as for the arguments pitted against the postulates of
religion in general and Christianity in particular. By way of  a summary
of  this chapter: deities of  religion are human creation (cf. 59); “religion
is precisely the wrong resource for thinking about moral issues in
the contemporary world, and indeed subverts moral debate” (69);
and lastly Grayling’s interesting fourth reason why religion exists (and
will always exist): “the natural ignorance, stupidity, superstitiousness
and gullibility of mankind” (74).
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Hopefully for Grayling, after centuries of  Western Europe’s
‘Gothic past’ (87), a rebirth of  humanistic ideals sprang roughly
starting in the 13th century: the advent of  Renaissance humanism.
After almost nine centuries of  dark Middle Ages, the second
Enlightenment dawned. The Renaissance was a rebirth of  the
intellectual spirit that animated classical antiquity. There was a careful
and deliberate introduction of  outlook concerning the dignity of
man that runs opposite to the prevailing Christian contemptus mundi
attitude (91): the glorification of reason and the praise of the human
body, fomented by the discovery and editing of  ancient texts,
especially by Cicero, Tacitus and Lucretius. The second
Enlightenment, which found its peak in the 17th century, flowered
into the Third Enlightenment of  the 18th century, buttressed by the
rise of  scientific revolution. For Grayling, alluding to Diderot’s Les
Bijoux Indiscrets, the third (and definitive?) Enlightenment, with the
pursuit of  scientific and empirical inquiry independent of  external
(religious) authority, gave “a mighty blow” to religion “whose pillars
soar upwards into a fog”, shattering it “to the ground” (112). “Écrasez
l’infâme,” as Voltaire would briefly have it.
If  there is a singular word that identifies the 18th century
Enlightenment, it is autonomy, specifically autonomy from religious
hegemony. And if  “the aim of  enlightenment is to think for oneself
and choose for oneself  – this autonomy conceived as essential to
the life worth living – then it is essential that one should be equipped
to think fruitfully and to choose wisely” (118). Hence results the
conception of  the Encyclopédie, “a work of  education, designed as a
tool for the illumination and thus liberation of the mind” (ibid.).
This autonomy of  thinking underlies the ‘enlightened’ reasoning of
the two foremost philosophers, among the French philosophers, of
the 18th century: the Scottish empiricist Hume and the German idealist
Kant; the one conceiving the morally good life as free from “the
superstition of  religion and enthusiasm of  philosophy”, the other
grounding duty not on the command of  some deity but on what he
called ‘categorical imperative’.
With the preceding centuries’ shifting the grounds on which ideas
about humanity, freedom and values are founded, the future holds a
canvass of  opportunity to paint a new portrait of  reality, now stripped
of  the superstition of  religion and the tyranny of  priestcraft (to which
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Grayling later on added the autocracy of  Monarchy). As such, the
19th century was “a fertile age for a new breed of  prophet” (141).
Luminaries of  this century include Darwin and his reinvention of
humanity with the theory of  evolution; Bentham and Mill with their
notion of  utility and liberty; and Nietzsche and his revaluation of
values. All these fomented in a “crisis of  outlook” from where
Grayling draws his insistence that the public and political sphere
needs to be totally and radically secularized if there be prospects of
good life for mankind.
Grayling characteristically called the 20th century, not surprisingly,
as ‘shameful’ (163). The human atrocities of  this century that left
millions dead, and the remaining almost disillusioned found a way
for a “rediscovery of  ethics”. In this section of  the book, we find
Grayling, almost apologetically, dishing out arguments to show, if
not prove, that philosophical ideas of  the humanist persuasion
continue to have much bearing in the present century’s ethical
concerns, from economic to environmental, to even animal rights.
In order to more fully hit the nail on the head, Grayling zeroes in on
the issue about the “right to die”. Not surprisingly, given his
intellectual patrimony, he argues in favor of  it, introducing his
arguments with a calm recollection that in ancient Imperial Rome,
“[s]uicide and assisted suicide were commonplaces” (177). I leave to
the reader the judgment on whether his arguments are convincing,
if  not reasonable. If  we gather autonomy as the byword of  the
preceding century, in the “shameful” 20th century, it is tolerance. For
Grayling, surprisingly, the more varying and competing opinions there
are (especially about human nature, freedom and value), “the more
chance [one] has of  expanding his understanding, refining his
sympathies, and considering his options” (202).
In concluding the book, Grayling argues that we need to be
enthused by the humanistic secular spirit that had its root in classical
antiquity nominating “individual liberty, the pursuit of  knowledge,
the cultivation of  pleasures that do not harm others, the satisfaction
of  art, personal relationships, and a sense of  belonging to the human
community, as the elements of  the good life” (203). For Grayling,
such elements are undermined by the religious transcendental attitude;
and religions actually encourage the opposite of  these as the ideal
kind of  human life.
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Indeed, contemporary times seem to find religion in a bad light,
with the religiously motivated political conflict in the Middle East,
Islam as fomenting a terrorist fundamentalism, and the general
disagreement among religions themselves. The critique of  Grayling
against religion is not without merits, and indeed, there are very few
books one encounters where the author blatantly but insightfully
says the obvious that our sympathies try to hide. For any reader
sympathetic of  religion, Grayling’s book is worth a ponder, especially
on how he appears to convincingly paint that religion in general, and
Christianity in particular, seemed to have failed in giving a viable
answer to the question of  the good life; a notion of  good life that
though finding culmination in the life here after never undermines
and deprecates the life here now.
Finishing the book, one wonders about the actual merits of  a
book that once again pit religion and science/humanistic ideas against
each other. Though mounting historical facts may truly put the two
in clear opposition, perhaps a breath of  fresh air may come with a
deliberate “crisis of outlook” that tries to see science and religion,
the humanistic and transcendental attitudes in less opposing, if not
complimentary, terms. Hans Küng, in much of  his recent publications
does argue that “there can be no world peace without peace among
religions” (cf. his Global Responsibility: In Search of  a New World Ethic
[1993]). Both Küng and Grayling implicitly or explicitly accept that
there will always be religion (regardless of  whatever reasons given),
and science and the humanistic values are likewise here to stay;
perhaps the more tenable approach lies in the conjunction and not
in the disjunction. Admittedly, Grayling already intuits that each
approach dominates its own sphere, and towards the end of  the
book, he insists on keeping the public domain of  politics and morality
free from religious intrusions (relegating religion in the purely private
and personal domain). This would naturally be problematic since at
least the so-called ‘religions of  the book’ themselves are inherently
public in character and orientation. In the end, the ultimate question
that may be raised is: does only one attitude have a valid monopoly of
the public sphere? For Grayling, yes, and it is the humanistic and
secular attitude. On this respect, Alfred North Whitehead offers a
refreshing insight in his Science and the Modern World (1925). For him,
the word that characterizes the relationship between science and
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religion is conflict. But every conflict or clash of  doctrines is also an
opportunity. Transposing Whitehead’s treatment to Grayling’s
opposition between religious and humanistic approaches, the
following words of  Whitehead opportunely applies: “The clash is a
sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives within which a
reconciliation of  a deeper religion and a more subtle science will be
found…. In an intellectual age there can be no active interest which
puts aside all hope of  a vision of  the harmony of  truth” (185).
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We find in A. C. Grayling’s book an informative and highly
readable survey of  the history of  ideas intended to present “the best
that has been thought and said about the good life for human beings”
(1).  It is immediately apparent from the outset what comprises the
best in his estimation: the liberal values of  autonomy and self-
determination, seen as the bright bloom of  secular humanism
throughout various periods of  history.
The first flowering is to be found in classical philosophy, from
the investigations of  the pre-Socratics up to Aristotle, followed by
the ethical schools of  the Hellenistic period.  Other upsurges of  the
humanist ideals which are also constitutive of  the march of  human
progress, are found in the return to classical thought and care for
human dignity in the Renaissance. This leads us to the full pre-
eminence given the free use of  reason in the Enlightenment of  the
18th century.  This in turn heralds the predominance of  the scientific
approach in the last two centuries, as Grayling elaborates on the
ideas of  Darwin and Nietzsche and the utilitarian philosophers,
particularly insofar as they posit a challenge to religious thought.  A
chapter is assigned to each one of  these various periods as he lucidly
presents major proponents in each, bringing to life the character and
concerns of each age, thereby drawing out the important
K. Masong and J. Principe • The Best Way to Live
128
contributions they made in our understanding of what constitutes a
good life.
The omission in this historical study is blatant: what about the
good life as it appears in the characteristically religious thought of
the medieval ages?  In Grayling’s estimation, all religiosity – and
therefore, all religious thought and religiously-grounded ethics –
presents a transcendental vision of  the good life unachievable in this
world and diametrically opposed to the values of  secular humanism.
He clearly announces that his project involves in recovering the ethical
humanist perspective of  the ‘good life’ against the tyrannical
hegemony of  religious thinking: “My claim is that the great ethical
debate that has always confronted mankind, and does so still, is
between a fundamentally humanistic view and the religious moralities
it opposes” (8).  We will need to focus, then, on this primary
contention.
He does assign a chapter to religious thought, entitled ‘The
Ordinances of  God’, where he points to the disjunction between
metaphysical religious beliefs and a rational ethics that may have been
inspired by faith.  Any religious ethics is, for Grayling, “ultimately
based on a sanction of  posthumous rewards and punishments” (81)
wherein one “achieves the good by obedience to an authority that
tells him what his goals are and how he should live” (248).  All religious
ethics is reduced to a divine command theory which is rightly viewed
as an unsatisfactory ethical precept because of  its non-rational base.
Grayling, however, goes further and delineates a divide between what
he sees as the unthinking obedience in religiosity, on the one hand,
and human progress, on the other.  Religious ethics, especially
Christian ethics, is thought to be scanty and self-serving, a ‘perfumed
smokescreen’ which does not allow for independent thought.
The book delivers quite a powerful critique, one that sheds light
on the failings of  the major religions to bring about heaven on earth.
However, a question may be asked whether this unfortunate reality
justifies Grayling’s assertion of  seeing religion to be a worthless
ground for human activity. He also fails to consider, for example,
what various religious thinkers in history may have contributed to
the development of  ideas and understanding of  human nature, or
what place religious belief  might occupy in one’s conception of  the
good life.
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This kind of imbalance is apparent in a variety of ways
throughout the text.  After rightly stating that any consideration of
the good life requires a particular understanding of  the human person,
this all-important question is apparently forgotten, as we are presented
only with the merits and failings of  Freudian psychoanalysis.  Also,
after solemnly announcing that the differences between
Enlightenment and Romanticism are presented not so as to force us
to choose between one or the other, he summarily dismisses the
latter by telling us that “the good life for human individuals certainly
requires the best of  both traditions, but arguably it least requires the
worst aspects of  Romanticism” (141).  On the other hand, in
defending the views of  the Enlightenment against its detrators, he
becomes much more voluble, quickly dismissing worries about the
excesses of  the scientific and technological outlook by distinguishing
between “[scientific] mastery intended to liberate mankind [and] the
mastery over the majority of  mankind exercised by those who…
came to control the levers of  economic and political power” (144).
While he is certainly right to distinguish between science as a method
and its various practitioners whose applications of  it are dubious or
even downright immoral, he does not extend this courtesy to religion
and some instances of  misconduct in religious leadership, choosing
instead to simply denounce “a Church whose corruptions largely
consisted in a venal enjoyment of  those same alleged sources of
misery” (124).
In order to make his point, Grayling’s strategy is to present us
with as unfavourable notion of  all religious thought as possible,
embellishing it with gruesome pictures of  the truly lamentable and
repressive practices that have littered the histories of  major religions.
All religions are dismissed as, first, anti-moral, in their ways of
“distracting attention from what really counts and focusing instead
on trivia” (79-80) and, then, as immoral, given the excesses performed
by religious fanatics.  In stark contrast, we are presented with a highly
desirable notion of  humanistic values and its immediate identification
with liberal thought and scientific outlook.
The excesses of  science and technology are briefly mentioned
as potential dangers and are immediately dismissed. One comes away
with the blithe optimism that all scientific thought is singularly
directed towards the promotion of  universal human happiness.
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Science and technology is not spoken of  as anti-moral or immoral,
as though they have never been used for frivolous or reprehensible
ends. Yet when this is finally acknowledged, we are quickly reassured
that “science is often our best hope for dealing with science’s mistakes
and applications” (246).  At the same time, Grayling derides the
enemies of  science “whose beliefs about the world have remained
essentially unchanged since the Stone Age” (245). The reader thus is
made to feel that when one’s beliefs do not conform to the hegemony
of  science, they must be antiquated, naïve and worthless. Such beliefs
are worthless, apparently, because they are not faithful to human
nature. Ethics must fully be in keeping with human nature:
“promoting moral sensibility requires the continued humanisation
of  ethics – which means: rooting it securely in human needs and
values” (187).  It is supposed that science has the monopoly on what
is constitutive of  human nature. But is science the only creditable
bearer of  truth about the human? Is it not often the case that the
result of  scientific hegemony over human life is an experience of
alienation? How can one consider the scientific view to be humane
when one’s body is seen no more than an instrument of  dissected
bits and parts or one’s deepest thoughts and desires no more than
chemical atomic processes within an indifferent and wholly material
world?
Another point left unquestioned and yet requires investigation
is Grayling’s acceptance of  liberalism and all that it entails.  Even
when one accepts his stance that religious fanaticism is detrimental
to the good life, one can still ask whether complete liberal freedom is
the answer.  For instance, Grayling writes: “Religious – and especially
Christian – morality is not only irrelevant but inimical to modern
interpersonal relations and sexual attitudes, and the attempts to
perpetuate its distorting influence on human nature in this
fundamental aspect” (79).  This supposes that he – or perhaps each
person – is an authority on human nature, and is entitled to consider
anything and everything given by thoughtful religious teaching as
not simply misguided but downright dangerous.  This is because he
generalizes all religions, expecting an imposition of  “a harsh and
limiting uniformity on behaviour and opinion” (94) at every turn.
Beyond this extremist absolutism, is it not preferable to take a more
balanced position of  recognizing what value may be found in each
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specific teaching – religious or secular – concerning human dignity?
Similarly, one can also ask whether a liberal position, if  it truly leads
us to the good life, can also be balanced by an assimilation of  other
values that follow more communitarian lines.
The sketches that he gives at the outset are quite indicative of
the opposition he wants us to see between religion and liberalism:
on the one hand, there is a lyrical passage from Junichiro Tanizaki
which explores aesthetic contemplation; on the other hand, he
elaborates on the repressive Victorian upbringing of  Augustus Hare.
Here, it is suggested that all humanism is captured in an almost
mystical rapture of  aesthetic mindfulness while all religiosity is
generative of  suffering and deprivation.
These images are quite compelling but are things truly that
simple?  Must we not take a more nuanced view?  The questions that
we have posed here are not meant to challenge and declare false any
of  the assertions made by Grayling.  I do not argue against the idea
that “[b]y far most of  what has been a gain for both individuals and
civilisation in the West has come from the endeavours and triumphs
of  [the autonomy of  humanism]” (248).  Least of  all, my criticism
does not aim to be an apologia for religion.  My main point, however,
is this: that in our consideration of  the search for the good life, the
dualism Grayling creates is at best questionable.
It would have been interesting to see how religious thought has
been accommodated into the search for humanistic values, particularly
in the light of  the rising concern with various ethical issues in daily
life which he rightly elaborates on.  A consideration of  the good life
might have profited from trying to better investigate the psychology
of  religion, rather than simply agreeing to a neurophysiological
reduction. Also, one might try to understand the importance of
religion as a social phenomenon, rather than consign it to the
idiosyncratic private sphere.  Grayling focuses on religious ethics as
imposed, claiming that “the chief  motivation for religious ethics is
the need felt by potentates of  many kinds to exert control over
individuals, to limit their freedom, to make them conform, obey,
submit…” (248).  By concentrating on this view from above, he fails
to consider the view from below: the need and desire to obey, to
have something to follow, to believe in something greater than one’s
self  to which one belongs.  Not only do these form an integral part
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of any consideration of religious belief but one may also argue that
these aspects of  religiosity might outweigh the isolation of  one’s
liberal freedom, and the cold comfort of  belonging to an abstract
humanity in a truly atomic world.  This might sound strange to liberal
ears but it can take on new light when one sees a unique contemporary
phenomenon Grayling himself  speaks of. “Many people have given
up the older religious traditions,” he writes, “and substituted a Babel
of  New Age religion and quasi-religion in its place… because life
has become lifestyle and the shopping-mall ethos applies as much in
philosophies as in footwear. That is a fact; it is neither good nor bad
except as taste dictates” (239).  Is this observation not a concrete
invitation to see in it a reflection of  how a wholly secular world
leads to the erosion of  meaning and values, and the sorry loss of  –
and desperate need for – something to believe in.
In conclusion, What is Good? is a presentation of  a wide-ranging
survey, one that provides an excellent introduction to a number of
thinkers and ideas. It is also a presentation of  a forceful argument,
one which is bound to find many sympathetic readers in a secular
audience that has been disillusioned by the many failings of  organized
religion.  In it, various thinkers of  importance are very clearly
presented in an engaging manner, almost as characters in the
compelling story of  human progress.  However, one cannot help
but sense a certain imbalance in the presentation – one that all too
quickly dismisses everything that has to do with religion while
elevating science as mankind’s last great hope.
This imbalance is regrettable, not only because it compromises
the search for what indeed comprises the good life but fails to enter
into the open-mindedness and proper dialogical stance Grayling
himself  espouses.
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